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1Summary
Similar to Hungary’s experience over the past two years, several countries of the
world have experienced a fast and large scale real exchange rate appreciation. This
study examines in which cases rapid real exchange appreciation proved to be
permanent or transitory, what kinds of macroeconomic policies were adopted during
periods of appreciation, and what consequences real exchange rate appreciation
resulted in.
The goal of the present study was neither to examine ideal disinflation scenarios, nor
to study the connection between real exchange rate and economic growth, not even to
analyze possible consequences of the Hungarian real exchange rate appreciation.
Therefore, the questions of how large an appreciation may be needed to reduce
inflation or how large real exchange rate changes had accompanied economic catch-
up in certain countries were not analyzed. Also the questions of whether the actual
magnitude of appreciation was really needed in Hungary or even further appreciation
would be needed to reduce inflation were left out of consideration. This study does
not draw conclusions on the optimal disinflation process (i.e., resulting in a permanent
decrease of inflation with the least real economic costs) and the real exchange rate. Its
objective was narrower than this: it aimed to examine the macroeconomic steps taken
before and after appreciation in the countries where rapid exchange rate appreciation
developed within two years and the macroeconomic effects that real exchange
appreciation combined with applied economic policies caused.
As a result of the above objective, the study adopted a multinational approach: three
decades of experience of nearly one hundred countries had been included in the
analysis, but the selection of countries was finally reduced to three clear cut groups.
To promote widespread comparisons the study used real exchange rate figures based
on the consumer price index, but whenever it was possible, it also involved wage
developments.
Real exchange rate appreciation cannot be analyzed in its own as deviations from the
equilibrium real exchange rate that may cause macroeconomic effects. If a real
exchange appreciation of 20 percent, for example, accounts for one half the
adjustment of former undervaluation and results in only half of overvaluation, the real
economic consequences of ten percent overvaluation must be reckoned with instead of
the consequences of a 20 percent real exchange rate appreciation. Although we tried
panel techniques to estimate equilibrium real exchange rates for all countries
analyzed, the results were unsatisfactory.1 Consequently, we conjecture on the
equilibrium real exchange rate indirectly based on the behavior of the current real
exchange rate and the developments of macroeconomic variables.
The two main lessons of the paper stress the importance of the equilibrium real
exchange rate and macroeconomic policies. For example, in those floating exchange
rate regimes where the real exchange rate appreciation proved to be transitory but led
to a permanent reduction of inflation and the external balance did not deteriorate
during the appreciation and the output loss was less pronounced than in many
exchange-rate based stabilizations, fiscal policies tightened during the appreciation
                                                
1 The value of the Hungarian forint’s equilibrium exchange rate, however, is currently under
investigation by a working group at the Economics Department of the MNB .
2period and nominal wage growth declined parallel with falling inflation. This
statement underlines the role of macroeconomic policies. The statement was also
fundamentally characteristic of cases where real exchange appreciation remained
permanent after a period of undervaluation. At the same time, adjustments for
undervaluation often resulted in greater macroeconomic volatility. This statement
draws the attention to the importance of the equilibrium real exchange rate.
The two main lessons are based on the following conclusions:
1. Appreciation episodes can be broken down into three groups:
(1) Appreciation remained permanent.
(2) Temporary appreciation following an initially fixed exchange rate regime and
deteriorating fiscal balance. This policy mix resulted in significant economic
chaos (renewed inflation burst and a substantial decrease of GDP);
(3) Temporary appreciation under a floating exchange rate regime, an improving
fiscal balance, and basically constant real wages. This policy mix resulted in a
permanent decrease in inflation, although at a non-negligible cost in terms of
GDP and employment.
2. Permanent appreciation
The possibility of extensive exchange rate appreciation becoming permanent is equal
to the question of whether the settled exchange rate is close to the equilibrium. Such
cases can basically be divided into three groups: (1) Before appreciation an
undervalued real exchange rate develops due to a rigid exchange rate system,
originating, for example, in the slow flow of factors and price and wage adjustment
(examples of this could be Portugal and Denmark at the end of the 1980s, or
Switzerland, Austria and Norway at the dissolution of the Bretton-Woods system in
1973). (2) Economic catch-up based on quick expansion in productivity results in
rising equilibrium exchange rates (the classic example is Japan). (3) Countries in
transition where transition began with a highly undervalued real exchange rate.
3. Temporary appreciation can be divided into two clearly distinguishable groups.
Temporary appreciation usually takes place during times of disinflation efforts and
they are most probably temporary because the real exchange rate becomes
overvalued– for the very purpose of helping disinflation. Temporary appreciation can
be divided into two clearly definable groups in terms of both their circumstances and
consequences. The following table summarizes the differences.
3Table 1: Main features of temporary appreciation episodes
Group One – Disinflation Ending in
Failure
(Latin America and several other countries2)
Group Two – Permanent Disinflation
(Developed countries – Australia, Canada, the
United Kingdom and New Zealand3)
Nominal exchange rate
Fixed exchange rate or crawling
devaluation of a decreasing rate
Under a floating exchange rate regime,
two thirds of real exchange appreciation
was the result of appreciation of the
nominal exchange rate
Initial level of inflation
Between 20 and 100 percent Nine percent on average
Rate of appreciation
Between 15 and 70 percent, 40 percent on
average in 2-3 years
Between 15 and 27 percent, 23 percent on
average in 2-3 years
Persistence of appreciation
When the exchange rate has reached its
highest level, adjustment began
immediately and the original exchange
rate was restored within a year
When the exchange rate has reached its
highest level, this level remained for two
years and in the ensuing two years
correction took place in an equal
proportion each year
Foreign economic activity
Deteriorated during appreciation but grew
afterwards
After the culmination of appreciation it
deteriorated and GDP growth only started
to approach the former level four years
after appreciation
Economic growth prior to and at the end of appreciation
In both groups, growth of about four percent had been typical before appreciation,
which fell to two percent at the culmination of appreciation
Post-appreciation economic growth
A significant decrease in GDP that was
followed by an overshooting re-
acceleration
A slight decrease in GDP and then
accelerating growth, which had reached its
former speed in the fifth year after the
culmination of appreciation
                                                
2 Similar features are observable in the attempts of Portugal in the late 1970s, and in the recent Turkish
and Russian events.
3 Similar features are observable in the appreciation period of Sweden between 1988 and 1990 with the
substantial difference that a fixed exchange rate system was in operation, and flotation only took place
in the adjustment period.
4Rate of Unemployment
(Insufficient data available) During appreciation it dropped from seven
to six percent and then, during permanence
of the highest level of the real exchange
rate, it rose to ten percent
Fiscal Policy
The budget deficit of four years earlier,
which had amounted to four percent of
GDP, rose to seven percent, and after
appreciation (simultaneously with
recession) significant adjustments were
necessary
The budget deficit of four years earlier,
which had amounted to four percent of
GDP, dropped continuously, which
resulted in a balanced fiscal policy by the
end of the appreciation period; in the
adjustment period deficit rose to two
percent of GDP
Interest Policy
(Insufficient data available) Strict tightening is evident: Previous real
interest rates of about four percent rose to
over six percent, which may have had a
role in the appreciation of the nominal
exchange rate
Developments in wages
(Insufficient data available) Increases in nominal wages kept with
falling inflation, and only by the third year
after appreciation (when growth of GDP
also regained momentum) commenced
real wages to increase by one or two
percent
Current balance of payments
Deficit skyrocketed Deficit during appreciation was practically
stable and decreased during post-
appreciation adjustment
Export market share
The market share decreased continuously
during and after appreciation
The market share grew during
appreciation, but during permanence and
adjustment for appreciation permanent
losses occurred in the market share
Post-adjustment real exchange rate
The real exchange rate preceding appreciation was restored in both groups
Economic catch-up
None of the countries in the two groups was in a catching up phase; their relative state
of development remained virtually unchanged.
51. Introduction*
Since the beginning of the transition the real exchange rate – the nominal exchange
rate adjusted for inflation – of the Hungarian forint has appreciated year by year.
Appreciation significantly accelerated after the widening of the exchange rate band in
May 2001, due to the fact that the exchange rate versus the euro approached the
strong edge of the band. Real exchange appreciation in the past two years, i.e., the
period between Q4 2000 and Q4 2002, was 21.3 percent with respect to the 24 main
foreign trading partners, using consumer prices to calculate the real exchange rate, out
of which 12.3 percent was the result of appreciation of the nominal-effective
exchange rate. The nominal exchange rate of the forint depreciated sharply in June
2003. Taking this into account, the end-June level of the real exchange rate was still
14.9 percent higher than in the last quarter of 2000.
Several other countries in the world have experienced rapid and large scale real
exchange rate appreciation. Useful conclusions can, therefore, be drawn from
surveying international experience and analyzing in which cases rapid real exchange
appreciation proved to be permanent or transitory, what consequences it caused and in
general, which other factors outcomes depended on. This study describes the initial
results of a research examining such issues. Data of 84 countries between 1970 and
2002 were included in the analysis; apart from all the OECD countries, developing
countries that are not mini states and whose main macroeconomic figures were
available have been included. For the benefit of making extensive international
comparisons we used the real-effective exchange rate index based on the consumer
price index to measure appreciation.4 Nearly all the examined countries experienced
rapid and extensive exchange rate appreciation since the 1970s, and a real exchange
appreciation of at least 15 percent within two years, for example, could be observed in
68 of the countries.
The analysis of the causes and consequences of rapid real exchange appreciation can
hardly be separated from the question of whether the post-appreciation real exchange
rate was close to the equilibrium or not. Obviously, if the process of appreciation
results from an adjustment to the equilibrium, no adverse real economic effect should
be reckoned with. Although the present multinational study does not address the issue
directly, since this would require comprehensive studies in each country. For the
Hungarian forint, the equilibrium real exchange rate is currently under investigation
by a working group at the Economics Department.5
Consequently, this study surveys conclusions that can de drawn from the statistical
data provided in the first place and aspects concerning the equilibrium real exchange
                                                
* I am grateful for all the useful remarks and input received on MNB’s various internal forums, on a
seminar, and through additional consultation. I am especially grateful to Ágnes Csermely, István
Hamecz, László Halpern, Judit Neményi, András Simon and György Szapáry for detailed comments
and suggestions, however, I am solely responsible for any errors that may have remained.
4 The real and nominal/effective exchange rates were calculated based on the consumer price indices in
comparison with the 24 main foreign trading partners, using a fixed system of weights representing the
foreign trade structure of the 1990s. Some main foreign trading partners of several countries, such as
Brazil, China, Russia, Hong Kong and the majority of the Former Yugoslav republics, were left out of
consideration due to the lack of a reliably long time-series.
5 Some experimental calculations were made to estimate the equilibrium real exchange rates of each
country studied using  panel models, but the estimates did not lead to acceptable results.
6rate are analyzed only indirectly, as inferred from the macroeconomic processes
observed.
We start with those countries in which appreciation proved to be transitory and
continue with those where appreciation remained permanent.
2. Transitory Appreciation
Countries that experienced temporary appreciation can be divided into two markedly
distinct groups both in terms of the circumstances and consequences of appreciation.
2.1 Disinflation based on fixed exchange rate in countries having high
inflation
The experience of Latin American countries is described in detail in the literature.6
Their main characteristics are the following: (1) Continuous decrease in inflation, but
at the same time, only slow convergence to the nominal exchange rate (to fixed rates
or to decreasing pace of crawling devaluation), (2) substantial real appreciation lasting
for several years, (3) deterioration of the current balance of payments and the balance
of foreign trade, (4) a decrease in production after an initial expansion, (5) the
increase of the budget deficit after an initial decrease. Mainly heterodox stabilization
policies were introduced in countries with chronic inflation, in which anti-inflation
policies based on the exchange rate were accompanied by price and wage restrictions.
In spite of this, as a result of the slow convergence of inflation, the real exchange rate
appreciated and the trend of the real exchange rate was characterized by an arch
shaped curve: initial appreciation (lasting for several years), and depreciation
afterwards (at the end of the program) could be observed. The main factor of the
deterioration of the current balance of payments was an expansion of imports, which
had been initially financed by considerable capital influx. Eventually, the main trend
in the real economy was fast growth in consumption (even faster than GDP growth)
before a period of crisis. Heightened investments also took part in the formation of
business cycle in several countries. This cycle was also observable in the case of
successful programs – which were not followed with a repeated acceleration of
inflation – such as Israel’s 1985 stabilization, to mention an example.
To numerically present the stylized facts of the literature, the figures of 21 Latin
American countries were examined, out of which countries experiencing large-scale
appreciation over a short period of time had been selected. Detailed data of the
countries examined can be found in Appendix “A” (page 34). Twenty instances of
appreciation7 were chosen from among them and the average behavior was calculated,
which is shown in the two figures below.8 When calculating averages the culmination
                                                
6 Both the empirical and theoretical literature had been surveyed in a former study: DARVAS, Zsolt
(1998): Moderált inflációk csökkentése - Összehasonlító vizsgálat a nyolcvanas-kilencvenes évek
dezinflációit kísérő folyamatokról, MNB Füzetek 1998/9.
7 Argentina: 1974, 1980, Bolivia: 1985, Chile: 1981, Colombia: 1997, El Salvador: 1985, 1989, Haiti:
1999, Jamaica: 1977, 1983, Mexico: 1975, 1981, 1994, Paraguay: 1983, Peru: 1975, 1982, Uruguay:
1971, 1982, Venezuela: 1983, 2001.
8 We must emphasize that during appreciation exchange rates in these countries were either pegged to
the dollar (in 12 instances out of the 20), or depreciation took place at a gradually decreasing pace (the
remaining 8 instances), but nominal strengthening did not occur in any of the countries. At the same
time, 11 countries appreciated to various degrees in the nominal/effective sense, due to the fact that
7of appreciation was defined as year zero and averages of the previous and subsequent
six years were taken.
The first figure shows the level of real – and nominal – effective exchange rate
compared to the third year before the culmination of appreciation (denoted as:
REER_CPI, NEER), and the annual rate of increase of the consumer price index
(CPI). The inflation figures presented are more favorable than the real ones, since at
the calculation of the average countries where hyperinflation followed devaluation
were omitted, for their inclusion would have marred the figure (these countries were
also omitted at the calculation of the average nominal-effective exchange rates).
The second figure shows GDP growth (GDP), the current balance of payments
(CA/GDP), the government budget balance (GOV/GDP)9, the weighted GDP growth
of foreign trade partners (WGDP)10 and the domestic (GAPHP) and foreign
(WGAPHP) output gaps calculated with the Hodrick-Prescott Filter. The last two
variables are at best indicative, since the HP Filter is based on the assumption that
potential output has a low-variability or a "smooth" process, which is a controversial
assumption. If GDP decreases, for example, from one year to another as an effect of a
structural shock, which may also reduce economic potential in the long run, the use of
the HP Filter suggests the wrong conclusion that the economy had already been
overheated before the shock, and was excessively slow afterwards. Output gap figures
presented in the graph are therefore to be handled with reservations.11
The figures presented describe major macroeconomic processes and the applied
exchange rate and fiscal policies. Although the figures presented draw a
comprehensive picture of the economy, no particular significance can be assigned to
any of the variables, since an appropriately specified macromodel would be required
in order to account for the marginal contribution of each variable to the failure. It
cannot be stated, for example, that a highly increased deficit of the current balance of
payments was solely responsible for causing the exchange rate crisis, although it must
have been an important factor.
The graphs are self-explanatory, and naturally they coincide with the major
conclusions of the bibliography. The transitory nature of real exchange appreciation is
striking: the real exchange rate practically returned to the value it had been at before
the real exchange appreciation averaging at 40 percent. The decrease of GDP and the
repeated rise of inflation to around 40 percent reflect the failure of the programs.
Unsuccessful fiscal and monetary policies, whose effects were further aggravated by
unfavorable external activity, form the root cause of the failure. The exchange rate
was fixed under circumstances where inflation was still high, and these countries – as
                                                                                                                                           
currencies of other Latin American countries weakened (there was almost always a country where there
was hyperinflation, causing appreciation in the partner countries in the nominal/effective sense, even if
its importance was relatively small in international trade).
9 The two deficit figures are unfortunately not available for each country.
10 When weighting GDPs the same weights were used as in the case of real exchange rates, however,
Brazil is also among the foreign trade partners, as its GDP figures are available, and it is an important
partner of several countries of Latin America.
11 Different methods for calculating the potential output are surveyed in detail in Zsolt DARVAS –
Gábor VADAS (2003): Univariate Potential Output Estimates for Hungary, to be published in the near
future.
8the figure below also indicates12 – were not on a catching-up track (except for Chile),
which would have supported a permanent appreciation of the real exchange rate.
Although long-lasting and favorable economic growth could be observed prior to
appreciation, fiscal policies did not seize this opportunity to reduce deficits. On the
contrary, budget deficits deteriorated and deficits skyrocketed in the last year of real
exchange appreciation, where the pace of the economic growth had already slowed
down significantly. Fiscal adjustment, therefore, had to be implemented after an
exchange rate crisis broke out (the average fall of the nominal/effective exchange rate
was 40 percent over one year) and GDP was decreasing, thus aggravating the adverse
impacts of the crisis.
Since the deepest point in the developments of GDP after appreciation did not occur
in the same year everywhere – even though tendencies were similar – an even more
unfavorable picture unfolds by individually considering the minimum of economic
outputs for each country: on average a decline of 4.3 percent was observable, but
there was also an example of a decline of 13.4 percent in GDP.
                                                
12 In the figure development was compared to the USA-Japan-Europe 80-5-15 percent average, which
roughly reflects the foreign trade structures’ average. European countries are represented by seven
nations.
9-100
-50
0
50
100
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
REER_CPI (level)
NEER (level)
CPI (annual inflation)
year
pe
rc
en
t
Main macroeconomic indicators (1) - Latin-America
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
GDP
CA/GDP
GOV/GDP
WGDP
GAPHP
WGAPHP
year
pe
rc
en
t
Main macroeconomic indicators (2) - Latin-America
The effect of exchange rate appreciation on export market shares is also worth
considering. In order to analyze this the share of each country in the imports of seven
major foreign trading partners (USA, Japan, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Spain
and UK) were calculated and then these shares were standardized, then figures of the
seven target countries were weighted together with the share of these countries in the
exports of each source country. Finally, an average of these figures was calculated for
10
each instance of appreciation.13 Calculations were made of overall imports (excluding
Japan and Venezuela) of regional imports (i.e. imports coming from Latin America,
excluding Venezuela). While the exclusion of Japan is explained through its special
achievements (fast catching up, large-scale growth in export market shares), the
exclusion of Venezuela results from the high proportion of crude oil in its export14,
and the market share in comparison with that of the competitors excluding Japan and
Venezuela is therefore meant under the term “overall imports”.15
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Both figures emphasize the fact that significant market share losses occurred during
the appreciation, which practically remained permanent.
In summary, the applied economic policies were only able to reduce inflation
temporarily and with significant sacrifices, which proved to be futile because of the
repeated acceleration of inflation.
                                                
13 Since the standard deviation of the linear combination of standardized variables is not necessarily
one (although their average is zero), country figures were again standardized before regional weighting,
and after the combined weighting of the countries, the regional figure was standardized as well in order
to ensure that it is of the same scale as the figures of Portugal and the developed countries, to be
presented later.
14 A marked positive correlation can be demonstrated between the import share of Venezuela and oil
prices.
15 The figures simultaneously present the group of developed countries described in the following
section, as well as data on Portugal, also to be analyzed later. The term “regional import” appearing in
the figure to the right for developed countries and Portugal refers to imports originating in the
developed countries with the exception of Japan.
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2.2 Disinflation under floating exchange rates in countries having low
inflation
Fundamentally differing policies and processes from those encountered in Latin
America characterize those five developed countries, which have also experienced
rapid and large-scale exchange rate appreciation that later proved to be temporary
(Australia, the UK, Canada, Sweden and New Zealand)16. These countries – except
for Sweden – adopted a floating exchange rate system in the periods studied17. An
important difference from the Latin American examples is that appreciation of the real
exchange rate here occurred to a great extent through the appreciation of the nominal
exchange rate: For example, out of the average 19.5 percent real exchange rate
appreciation that occurred during the two years preceding the peak, 13.3 percent
resulted from the appreciation of the nominal exchange rate.18
Here we study average behavior, while detailed data of the countries between 1960
and 2001 can be found in Appendix “B” (page 41), and figures of the six years
preceding and following appreciation are found in Appendix “C” (page 44). Five
instances of four countries – excluding Sweden – were selected, and like the Latin
American examples, year zero was again defined as the year in which strong
appreciation peaked19. The two figures below present, as an addition to the variables
defined earlier, the annual increase of nominal wages (denoted as: WAGE), the real
interest rate (RI), and the unemployment rate (U).
                                                
16 The United States of America, being a large and essentially closed economy, was not examined.
17 Although the macroeconomic processes of Sweden reflect the same phenomena as experienced in the
other four countries, due to the lack of nominal exchange rate appreciation preceding real exchange rate
appreciation, averages without the figures of Sweden will be analyzed.
18 Nominal exchange rate appreciation versus the dollar was even higher, at 18.5 percent, and obviously
real appreciation in comparison with the US was also stronger.
19 Australia: 1989, Canada: 1989, Great Britain: 1980, New Zealand: 1988, 1996
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These countries implemented policies differing in many aspects from those of the
Latin American countries described in the foregoing. One of the basic differences,
which has already been mentioned, is the flotation of the exchange rate, which is
important for the fact that – without denying the known disadvantages of the floating
exchange rate in small/open countries – in these cases the authorities did not define a
fixed nominal exchange rate, which they endeavored to maintain (even despite the
value judgement of other market players) through capital restrictions and
interventions in the foreign exchange market. Another fundamental difference is that
fiscal policies continuously decreased the deficit during the period of appreciation,
13
that is, it happened in a period when economic growth was still favorable. It is notable
that in both the Latin American, as well as the developed countries deficits amounted
to four percent of GDP in the fourth year preceding the peak of appreciation, but
while the former countries increased the deficit, the latter gradually managed to
achieve a balanced budget.20 A considerable tightening of real interest rates was also
observable in the developed countries: previous real interest rates of about four
percent rose to over six percent, which may have played a role in strengthening the
nominal exchange rate.
Economic growth in both groups fell to two percent from the previous four percent at
the peak of appreciation, but while in the Latin American countries a significant
decrease even in the average GDP took place in the adjustment period, the average
growth of the developed countries only exhibits a slightly negative value.21 The
difference between the two groups of countries with respect to sacrificed growth is
further emphasized through differences in foreign demand. The growth of foreign
demand decreased significantly in Latin America during the last two years of
appreciation and the calculated foreign output gap also became negative at that time.
In the industrial states, however, foreign demand reached its lowest point after
appreciation, during its permanence. The foreign growth rate failed to attain its former
rate, and the calculated foreign output gap stabilized at a slightly negative value.
The figure below shows growth in comparison with foreign partners, including the
permanently appreciating Portuguese figures, to be analyzed later.
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It is apparent that the Latin American countries reacted with a far greater oscillation
during post-appreciation adjustment: GDP growth decreased to a greater extent,
although relative pick-up was also faster during years 3-5. Accumulated performance
                                                
20 Of course the fiscal figure used (the ratio of the total deficit to GDP) does not perfectly reflect the
stance of fiscal policy – especially in countries with different rates of inflation– but it facilitates
evaluation of the trends.
21 If minimum levels for each country in the years subsequent to appreciation are considered, decreases
in GDP, amounting to 0.4-2.1 percent and averaging at 1.2 percent in industrial countries, in contrast
with the Latin American average figure of 4.3 percent, are encountered.
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in comparison with the foreign countries during the thirteen years presented in the
figure was practically equal in both groups of countries, but in the six years following
appreciation industrial countries performed two percent better. The same conclusion
can be drawn with respect to the calculated output gaps shown in the figure below.
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The unemployment rate – whose figures were not available for the Latin American
countries, and therefore, no comparison could be made – dropped from seven to six
percent during appreciation and rose to ten percent during its permanence in parallel
with decelerating GDP growth, and only started to decrease gradually after the
repeated strengthening of GDP. This illustrates the cost of disinflation.
Figures of wage developments were also only available for the developed countries.
Real wages remained virtually unchanged during appreciation, and only after a
decrease in inflation and a repeated acceleration of economic growth did the average
growth of real wages develop to a level of about two percent.
A substantial difference from the Latin American examples arises with respect to the
deficit of the current balance of payments. Contrary to the large-scale deterioration in
Latin America, the account of the balance did not deteriorate in the developed
countries, which in part was probably due to fiscal tightening.
The export market share (presented in the figure on page 9) gives a mixed impression:
it improved during appreciation, but deteriorated following permanence and the
repeated depreciation of the exchange rate. These facts imply that shares were not
necessarily influenced by developments of the real exchange rate.
Divergences of the adjustment period are also worth considering. While in the
countries of Latin America the real exchange rate was fully adjusted for within a year,
the strong exchange rate practically persisted for two years in industrial countries, and
adjustment took place in the ensuing two years, where half of the exchange rate
devaluation occurred each year. Contrary to the Latin American countries, a
weakening exchange rate did not result in an expansion of inflation, which remained
at around two or three percent even afterwards. Resulting from the favorable
budgetary situation, however, these countries could allow loosening fiscal policies
during the decline in the economic growth rate, whose deficit rose to two or three
15
percent of GDP, and also monetary policies, which is reflected through a reduction of
real interest rates from six to four percent.
In summary, disinflation also took its toll in these countries, however, the degree of
the sacrifices was smaller than in Latin America, and the business cycles were less
varying. Due to the economic policies implemented the decline of inflation remained
permanent. The temporary nature of exchange rate appreciation was probably partly
due to the fact that neither of these countries were in a catch-up period (see the
following figure22), so they may have been overvalued to a certain extent during
disinflation. Thus the final exchange rate depreciation can be attributed to at least
three possible root causes: (1) Adjustment for overvaluation, (2) Decline in the GDP
growth rate, as an unfavorable indicator to the market players, (3) Decreasing
differences in interest rates23.
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3. Permanent Appreciation
First we summarize the cases in which permanent depreciation occurred. A review of
Portugal’s real appreciation, occurring in the late 1980s, follows afterwards, which
resembles the Hungarian situation in several regards, then exchange rate diagrams of
the rest of the countries follow.
 Czech Republic: The Czech koruna has been appreciating at the same increasing
rate as the Hungarian forint since 2000, however, it is still too early to declare
whether this appreciation would prove permanent. The interest rate margin
relative to the euro zone has been practically nil or negative in the Czech Republic
for years now, which is attributed to the Czech inflation rate dropping to a single-
digit figure, so the Czech Central Bank’s interest rate policy is not to blame for the
speculative investments flooding the country. The Czech experience is thus
                                                
22 In the figure development was compared to the USA-Japan-Europe 50-25-25 percent average.
European countries are represented by seven nations.
23 It is also evident in the figures that, at a certain degree of decrease in inflation, real interest rates also
started to decline, so nominal interest rate differences could drop at a greater rate than the decrease in
the real interest rate.
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particularly interesting, since the interest differential is zero and the economic
growth rate was less than in Hungary even after the gradual recovery from the
1997 exchange rate crisis and stabilization. Notwithstanding, the real exchange
rate (within the frame of a floating exchange rate mechanism) is appreciating as
quickly as in Hungary, by and large due to a strengthening nominal exchange rate.
Lower initial price levels partly explain the rapid appreciation occurring in the
early 1990s, however, their impact diminished with time. One of the causes of the
present rapid appreciation could be the so-called convergence speculation similar
to that experienced in Hungary, while another key motivator was accelerated
influx of direct capital investment, which in the 1990s fell significantly short of
Hungary’s and Poland’s figures, partly for regulatory reasons. From 1998 to 2002
a total of EUR 26.9 billion in foreign direct investment reached the Czech
Republic (including reinvested income), while during the same period the Czech
Central Bank’s cumulative foreign exchange intervention amounted to EUR 6.2
billion. And the very basis of appreciation is economic development. Only a
detailed analysis of the real exchange rate’s evolution and/or its future will tell
whether the level of appreciation will persist in the Czech Republic.
Notwithstanding, the main macroeconomic indicators do not exhibit signs of
overvaluation: after the exchange rate crisis of 1997 (which incidentally has no
impact on the annual real exchange rate trend), growth gained vitality after several
years of slow recovery despite poor external development, the current-account
balance stabilized at five percent of GDP, and Czech exporters continue to gain
further market shares on export markets. Appendix “C” illustrates the Czech
Republic’s main macroeconomic figures (page 54).
 The appreciation experienced in the three Baltic states has been quite rapid since
the beginning of the transition, however, over the last two or three years the time
series of the real exchange rate had leveled off, without any crisis. The fact, that
the countries started off at an extremely low wage and price level after the
transition, however, makes their assessment difficult.
 Additional former Soviet states, Bulgaria, Romania, the southern Slavic
succession states, Poland and the Czech Republic: in the initial years of
transition an enduring increase in exchange rates – similar that of the Baltic states,
albeit of a lower rate – occurred, which was probably also attributed to low initial
exchange rates and economic restructuring.
 Portugal: The real exchange rate appreciated by approximately 30 percent from
1988 to 1991, which level remained permanently stable after the transitional
impact of the EMS crisis of 1992/93.
 Denmark: The real exchange rate closely resembles that of Portugal24, however,
the amplitude is lower, with the rate of permanent appreciation between 1987 and
1989 being just thirteen percent.
 Norway: The real exchange rate trend is similar to those of Portugal and
Denmark, however, less time elapsed between the two peaks in this case (1977
and 1983).
                                                
24 Around 1975, a temporary appreciation took place in both countries, followed by an exchange rate
slump, then at the end of the 1980s real exchange rate rose again to the 1975 level, and following a
short period of fluctuation it remained permanent.
17
 Spain: A major appreciation period lasted for nearly a decade, which deserves
mention primarily on account of its duration, as nearly half of the former real
appreciation had been offset after the 1992/93 EMS crisis, and the level thus
established had stabilized.
 Great Britain: A real appreciation of nearly 30 percent took place after 1997 in a
short period of time, which proved permanent (up to the end of the reference
period in September 2002). The EMS crisis of 1992/93 might have foreshadowed
the appreciation, though it is remarkable that the real exchange rate was at a stable
low after and throughout the five years preceding the appreciation.
 Switzerland: An enduring appreciation, reaching 30-40 percent, occurred in the
early 1970s, which can be attributed to the adjustment of the undervalued real
exchange rate that developed during the fixed undervaluednominal exchange rate
of the Bretton-Woods system.
 Austria: Similarly to Switzerland, a rapid real appreciation of fifteen percent
occurred here during the early 1970s.
 Japan: In the post-1985 period the yen’s real effective exchange rate increased by
30 percent over two years, which was followed by an additional ten percent in a
few years. The resulting real exchange rate remained stable after some
fluctuations. The rapid appreciation, however, can be attributed the dollar’s
cycle25. If the evolution of the Japanese situation is examined from 1960 onwards,
it becomes clear that up to 1990 – i.e., the onset of the Japanese crisis – the yen
improved by 20 percent on average every five years in real terms.
In summary, permanent appreciation occurred mainly in the following cases:
 Rapid and permanent real appreciation occurred several times upon the
abandonment of fixed exchange rate systems, which led to presumably
undervalued real exchange rates perhaps because of slow price and wage
adjustments.
 In catch-up periods based on productivity growth.
 Unusually rapid real appreciation happened in countries undergoing transition in
the years following a change in regime, lasting for even several years, primarily
because of extremely low price and wage standards versus the exchange rate at the
outset and also due to economic restructuring.
In some countries major real depreciation preceded rapid appreciation, so the latter
might as well be considered as an adjustment, so these countries are not included in
the list of countries subject to enduring appreciation (a typical example of this is
Korea between 1986 and 1988).
3.1 Portugal:
3.1.1 Summary of Portugal’s exchange rate systems and main economic
developments
Over the last forty years, the real exchange rate in Portugal had undergone major
appreciation on two occasions: the first one peaked in 1975-76, during the massive
                                                
25 Before 1985 the dollar increased largely, changing the previous appreciation trend of the Japanese
real exchange rate, which was virtually stable between 1980 and 1985.
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inflation following the oil price explosion, while the other more than fifteen years
afterwards, in 1992. A smaller peak occurred between the two major ones around
1982-83, which – albeit falling short of the real appreciation rate – was similar to the
appreciation of 1975 as regards the macroeconomic outcome. The escudo’s real value
hiked to the same level in both cases of major appreciation, however, while the first
rapid appreciation proved a failure, the second rapid one endured. Had the real
exchange rate undergone gradual appreciation instead of rising dramatically, it would
have led to lower macroeconomic volatility, so in retrospect of several decades the
policies applied prior to 1983 could be deemed inappropriate. However, policies
applied after 1983 proved successful, so examining the Portuguese example in more
detail might prove informative.
The crawling peg exchange rate system was in use for thirteen and a half years in
Portugal, from August 1977 to July 1990.26 One of the key aims of crawling peg
devaluation was to curb inflation. The initial stage of the scheme resembled what a
number of Latin American countries had experienced during the same period, since
here too inflation was attempted to be curbed through active use of the exchange rate,
resulting in the same consequences of real appreciation, exchange rate crisis,
economic slump and inflation picking up again. As in many Latin American
countries, it was in 1977 that this kind of policy was introduced here to supplant the
previous exchange rate policy, and the emergence of the crisis also nearly coincided
(1982-83).
The adverse current account balance27 was partly addressed by supplemental
devaluation (in 1982-83), partly by raising the monthly devaluation rate, and partly by
applying tight fiscal and income policy (real wages decreased by sixteen percent in
three years). Resting on four pillars (budget adjustment, wage policy,
competitiveness, and monetary policy), this stabilization was accompanied by a
                                                
26 Portuguese experience regarding the crawling peg regime was addressed in detail in a previous study:
DARVAS, Zsolt (1998): Csúszó árfolyamrendszerek – Elmélet és nemzetközi tapasztalatok, MNB
Műhelytanulmány 16.
27 Due to methodological changes in the balance of payments in 1993 – adopted at different dates in
different countries – it is not possible to produce comparable current account balance figures
conforming to the current methodology for previous decades. In the previous methodology, the
balances of current account (CA), capital account (KA) and change in reserves summed up to zero,
taking into net consideration errors and omissions (NEO). In the previous methodology, all non-
refundable unilateral transfers, such as EU subsidies and remittances of emigrants formed part of the
current balance of payments. In the new methodology the previous current balance of payments was
divided into two: the current account (CA) and the capital account (KA), furthermore, the capital
account of the old methodology were renamed to financial account (FA). Therefore, unfortunately the
term “capital account” refers to two basically distinct concepts in the two methodologies. The new
capital account included those unilateral transfers, which were expressly serve as capital investment,
and also the turnover of non-produced and non-financial goods (e.g., patents). Thus, some of the EU
transfers remained in the current account, while others were moved to the capital account. In Portugal
and presumably in many other countries, data facilitating the division of the old current account is not
available retrospectively, therefore, current account data calculated according to the old methodology
(their source being the Banco de Portugal) is presented in the figures to promote comparison. In the
second half of the 1990s the difference between the two balances amounted to approximately two
percent of GDP. Since this ratio evolved in a relatively stable way, there is also economic argument to
handle these transfers as part of the current account – similarly to remittances of Portuguese workers
abroad, which is a significant item in Portugal. The same problem stands for other countries as well,
but since the amount of the capital account is generally negligible according to the new methodology in
the case of other countries studied in this paper, the distorting effects arising from the non-
comparability of current account balances of the two methodologies are also limited.
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particularly dramatic decrease in investments, even though the encouragement of
investment was a priority in the economic policy. The stabilization program managed
to restore the balance of payments on current account, and inflation – after an initial
upsurge – rapidly assumed a downward trend. The gap between exports and imports
improved to the benefit of exports in the two years following stabilization.
At the same time, post-1987 experience with the crawling peg system is in stark
contrast with the preceding period. The eight to -nine percent rise in consumer prices
in 1987 increased to fourteen by 1990, however, the annual devaluation rate
announced earlier had undergone a phased decrease to three percent, so the real
exchange rate had appreciated considerably. Explanations of rising inflation could
include a massive increase in demand encouraged by budget expansion, a decrease in
the effectiveness of monetary policy as a result of the deregulation of international
capital flows, an accelerating rise in wages, and even the reversal of the disinflation
trend in Europe. The gap between imports and exports widened considerably to the
benefit of imports over a period of three years, and the trade deficit widened.
Retrospective compensation stipulated in the wage agreements was not effected after
failure to meet the inflation target, so the consensus established in the course of
trilateral negotiations had broken down. The reaction of monetary policy to address a
deteriorating balance of payments and rising inflation was to tighten domestic
demand, which proved successful in terms of the external balance. At the same time,
the pre-announced devaluation and interest rate differential led to a significant rise in
foreign borrowing and of portfolio investments made by foreign investors, which in
turn weakened the effectiveness of  monetary policy and caused sterilization
problems. Financial innovation essentially minimized the efficiency of a monetary
policy relying on direct control and interest rate regulation. To this end, indirect
monetary regulation was adopted from the beginning of the 1990s, however, strict
capital limitations were re-introduced.
For nearly two years following the suspension of the crawling peg exchange rate
system, Portugal controlled its exchange rates through managed floatation, but this
failed to limit capital influx, so the rapid growth of foreign exchange reserves
continued: the value of reserves rose from the USD 2 billion figure in 1987 to USD 27
billion (!) in 1992. We may say that the Central Bank had little chance of keeping the
real exchange rate down given such a considerable influx of capital.
Foreign exchange reserves in Portugal
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3.1.2 Appreciation Prior to 1992
It is notable that by the early 1990s the real exchange rate rose to the same level as in
the mid-1970s, and while it proved only to be transitional in the seventies, in the
1990s the high rate remained permanent after some fluctuations (and it will surely
remain because of the monetary union). As in the case of the Latin American scenario
versus the developed world, there is a fundamental discrepancy between the current
account deficits of the two periods: while in the late 1970s and early 1980s the
country struggled with the problem of twin deficits, this was no longer typical in the
second period of appreciation.
The following two figures show detailed data for the second, enduring appreciation
period over the six years preceding and following peak appreciation (1992) (similar to
the Latin American and industrial countries reviewed in the previous chapter).
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The foreign cycle turned critical in the early 1990s and real interest rates gradually
rose up to 1993. Presumably, because of the combined effect of all these factors and
the real appreciation, Portugal’s GDP growth also declined  and even the GDP fell by
one and a half percent in 1993. The same factors are observable in the developed
floaters (Section 2.2), however, the relative growth outcome (compared to trading
partners) was better all along in Portugal (figure on page 13). The development of
export market shares was likewise much more favorable, which steadily improved in
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Portugal during appreciation, and stabilized thereafter (figure on page 9)28. At the
same time, with regard to budget policy Portugal’s difference from the industrial
countries exhibiting transitional appreciation is noteworthy: during the few years
preceding and following peak appreciation the deficit had not been reduced here, but
had varied at around four of five percent of GDP.  Moreover, wage policy was not as
disciplined as in the industrial countries either, as real wages increased by three or
four percent during appreciation. Starting in 1996, presumably in preparation for
monetary union, the budget policy had undergone a major shakeup.
Like in the previously mentioned countries the output gap was also calculated for
Portugal using the Hordick-Prescott filter, as well as the average output gap for the
partner countries weighted by exports, which is shown in the figure below. From the
1970s onwards a very close synchrony is noticeable between the cycles, which was
initially accompanied by higher volatility in Portugal, however, by the end of the
period, both the domestic and the foreign output gaps began to exhibit the same
amplitude. This was perhaps due to intensifying integration, though economic policy
might have also played a decisive role: the deficient policies (maintenance of an
overvalued exchange rate, budget spending) applied in the 1970s and early 1980s
contributed greatly to the high degree of variability.
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The evolution of the equilibrium exchange rate is also important for  the permanence
of real appreciation in the 1990s. It might have even been a decisive factor. The
estimation of the equilibrium real exchange rate was not attempted here, however, a
simple index was calculated: the relationship between the relative state of
development (compared to abroad) – which is approximated using GNI rated at per
capita purchasing power parity – and the relative price level (compared to abroad).
Considering all the countries in the world, a clear correlation is evident between price
level and development, however, this relationship applies only “roughly”: plotting the
data as a cross-sectional sample the dispersion is great around the 45 line. The reason
                                                
28 Following the 1975 appreciation period, foreign market share decreased significantly.
23
is that the price level in each country is determined by the productivity rates in the
individual sectors, which can differ even if the average income is the same. Plotting
relative development and price level as a function in time, however, it is possible to
have a quick idea of the equilibrium exchange rate’s situation. The figure below
shows these values for Portugal and Spain between 1975 and 2001, compared to the
average of six European countries29.
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Even though it was argued in the foregoing that the relative state of development and
the relative price level need not be identical – as evident, for example, in the figures
for Spain in the chart – in the case of Portugal the two indices nevertheless practically
equal. It is evident that during the appreciation of 1975 the price level rose high above
the state of development, while just the opposite occurred in the 1980s. The figure
thus strongly suggests that by the late 1980s the real exchange rate became
undervalued, and the consequent appreciation essentially brought the real exchange
rate to an equilibrium.
Important conclusions can be drawn on the basis of Spain’s figures as well. Beginning
in 1983 a major real appreciation process took place in Spain, which lasted for nearly
a decade, and whose cumulative value was by and large equal to the rapid
appreciation taking place over two or three years in Portugal in the late 1980s30. After
                                                
29 The EU average was not used as a reference for comparison because its composition changed from
time to time. In the World Bank’s database Germany’s pre-1991 figures were adjusted for the effects of
reunification.
30 Exchange rate and inflation resultants of appreciation differ from those of Portugal. In Spain 17.6
percent out of the 33.1 percent appreciation between the lowest point of the real exchange rate in 1983
and 1990 originated from the strengthening of the nominal exchange rate, but the whole instance can be
divided into two sub-periods. The nominal exchange rate was virtually stable between 1983 and 1987
(it appreciated just 2.0 percent during these four years), therefore, appreciation was generated through
the difference in inflation during this period. At the same time, 15.3 percent out of the 19.3 percent real
exchange rate appreciation between 1987 and 1990 was already due to the nominal exchange rate and
only 3.4 percent originated from the difference in inflation, since inflation in Spain exceeded only
slightly the inflation of its foreign trading partners at this time. In contrast, the majority of appreciation
in Portugal was due to surplus inflation, since the nominal exchange rate improved by only five percent
between 1990 and 1992.
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the 1992/93 ERM crisis, however, of the two countries it was Spain where permanent
real depreciation occurred. The figure showing relative state of development and price
levels precisely shows that for Spain the difference between the two indices
significantly exceeded the average by the early 1990s, which is indicative of an
overvalued real exchange rate. Order was practically restored between the two indices
as a result of the real depreciation following the crisis, in other words, the historical
average difference developed between them.
3.1.3 The considerable deterioration in the current account balance prior to EMU
accession
In order to study the permanence of the real exchange rate in Portugal it is imperative
to analyze the trends exhibited by the current account balance following appreciation.
As shown in the figure on page 20, the balance was close to zero up to 1995 when
significant deterioration developed. Theoretically, this could have been the result of
an overvalued exchange rate, however, the economic developments infer that this is
not the case. On the one hand, the fact that the balance of payments was in
equilibrium up to 1995 – i.e., for seven or eight years from the onset of appreciation in
1987/88 – contradicts this scenario, as deterioration should have appeared earlier at
that time. On the other hand, the increasing probability of the euro’s adoption and
good growth prospects could jointly explain the change in consumer habits, i.e., inter-
temporal optimization. Thirdly, data on foreign trade indicates that it was not the
exports that collapsed, but imports had risen, as shown in the figure below. Not
considering the temporary impact of the ERM crisis that cut back foreign trade, the
volume of exports measured in Deutsche Marks steadily rose even after 1996, while
the growth of imports gathered pace at the time.
Analysis of export market shares also leads to similar conclusions. The figure below
shows Portugal’s share in imports from industrial countries of the four principal
foreign trading partners31. Portugal managed to increase its share for all four countries
– particularly in Spain – from the mid-1980s, and no considerable decrease is evident,
even from 1996. Therefore, no relative market loss occurred in the export markets (as
also shown in the figure on page 9 for 1992+6 years, considering the seven main
trading partners).
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31 Germany, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom, which receive 68 percent of Portugal’s exports.
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3.2 Real exchange rate trends
3.2.1 Accession Countries
The figure below shows the real exchange rates of six accession countries. The
Hungarian and Czech real exchange rates (plotted with bold lines) rose at practically
the same accelerating rate as of 2000. In Poland the rate of appreciation was higher,
followed by a downward movement, so the real exchange rate level was restored to its
value two years earlier.
Because there is substantial trade among accession countries as well (e.g., the Czech
Republic accounts for 40 percent in the Slovak Republic’s foreign trade) the second
figure shows the real exchange rate as compared to Germany. As anticipated, the
appreciation compared to Germany was greater than the degree to which the real
effective exchange rate had strengthened.
Finally, the third figure below shows unit labor cost-based real exchange rate indices.
(As these figures are taken from an OECD source which had no legend, it is not clear
which group of foreign trading partners they had been compared to.) The figure shows
that while the Hungarian forint had undergone significant appreciation since 2000, a
major improvement in competitiveness developed beforehand, e.g., from 1996/97
appreciation on the whole was practically the smallest in Hungary.
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3.2.2 Baltic and Eastern Countries
Remarkably fast appreciation happened in the Baltic countries, while the fact that they
started off at an extremely low wage and price level after the change of regime, makes
their assessment difficult. This was the situation in the early 1990s in Bulgaria,
Romania and Russia. Rapid two-year appreciation periods are noticeable in the last
three countries even after the crises. The Bulgarian real exchange rate is striking in
that it visibly returned to the very same trend line after the 1996 hyperinflation crisis.
Turkey’s experience in the second half of the 1990s, however, is a fine example
where crisis ensued after a rapid appreciation period that lasted for seven years.
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3.2.3 “Peripheral” EMU Member States
Of the five “peripheral” EMU member states, the real exchange rate appreciated by
nearly 30 percent in Portugal – as surveyed in detail in the foregoing – between 1988
and 1991/92, remaining mostly stable, but temporarily weakening as a result of the
ERM crisis. An extensive appreciation trend (with a few brief readjustments) evolved
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in Spain during the period of disinflation: the escudo strengthened nearly 35 percent
over seven years from 1983, remaining at this level for two years and only weakening
significantly in response to the 1992/93 ERM crisis. While a period of depreciation
preceded appreciation in the early 1980s, this could have been a result of transitory
appreciation preceding it. A decade-long period of appreciation was also observable
in Greece as of 1986, however, its rate was only approximately two percent per
annum.
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3.2.4 Further Industrial Countries
All five countries (Austria, Denmark, Japan, Norway, and Switzerland) experienced
permanent appreciation upon the dissolution of the Bretton-Woods system, most
probably because of undervaluation caused by the fixed exchange rate system.
Denmark’s real exchange rate, on the other hand, resembles Portugal’s real exchange
rate surveyed in the foregoing, and Norway also exhibits similar processes in the mid-
1980s. Japan is a typical example of exchange rate improvement based on increased
productivity. Appendix “D” illustrates the main macroeconomic processes of these
countries (page 44).
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3.2.5 Latin America
Large-scale appreciation occurred in all of the 21 countries surveyed, with most of
them experiencing the aforementioned “worst-case scenario”. Permanent appreciation
is evident in only two countries, namely Barbados and Peru. Appendix “D” illustrates
the main macroeconomic indices of these countries (page 53).
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Barbados exhibits a somewhat bizarre picture, as the deficit on current account
accounted for 20 percent of GDP at the onset of massive appreciation in 1972-75,
while the trend was improving. At the beginning of a second major appreciation in
1982-85 there were several major deficiencies, however, the balance quickly turned
positive and remained at a near equilibrium for fifteen years. It is also important to
note that the favorable economic growth arising after both periods of extensive
appreciation is a phenomenon alien from the failed Latin American countries.
Hyperinflation hinders the evaluation of Peru’s figures: namely because the
uncertainty of the price indices rises in such cases, so real appreciation of more than
100 percent proving permanent could even be the result of an error in measurement:
In 1989/90 inflation was at 3,500-7,500 percent.
4. Some Conclusions Regarding the Hungarian Real Exchange Rate
Although the objective of this study was not to analyze the recent real exchange
appreciation of the Hungarian forint (a working group at the MNB is currently
investigating this), it is nevertheless worth comparing the Hungarian situation with
international experience. There are two main issues that deserve particular attention:
whether appreciation proves to be permanent32, and what its consequences are for the
real economy, whether it is transitory or permanent.
In comparison with international examples, Hungary does show similarities both with
the countries experiencing permanent, and with those exhibiting transitory
appreciation. According to our calculations, the real exchange rate of the forint had
become undervalued during the final stages of the crawling peg system. It is hard to
numerically define the degree of undervaluation, since different methods result in
different figures, but at the same it can be stated that the real exchange rate
appreciation experienced was – at least partly – an adjustment for undervaluation.
Among the examples of permanent appreciation, there is substantial similarity with
Portugal’s real exchange rate appreciation of about 30 percent in the late 1980s. In
both countries an economic stabilization program containing a significant fiscal
adjustment occurred some years before appreciation, and in both countries a crawling
peg regime was adopted to control real exchange rate appreciation. This policy was
able to reduce inflation from 30 to about ten percent and revitalize economic growth
in both countries, and also to reduce the enormous deficit of the current balance of
payments. Capital liberalization, intensifying European integration, and the resulting
strong capital influx were also common features, and the catch-up process gave
fundamental support to real exchange appreciation in both countries. In Portugal,
because of the high degree of capital influx, the authorities had no chance of keeping
the real exchange rate low any further.
The example of the Czech Republic also provides important lessons. Despite the fact
that according to the different calculations the so called Balassa-Samuelson effect
underlying real exchange rate appreciation was faster in Hungary than in the Czech
Republic, and Czech interest rates are virtually the same as the European ones, real
exchange rate appreciation of the Czech Koruna had been faster in the past, and in the
present it is of the same degree as the appreciation of the Hungarian forint, if based on
                                                
32 As we have already indicated, taking into account nominal exchange rate depreciation of the forint in
June 2003, the end-June level of the real exchange rate was still 14.9 percent higher than in the last
quarter of 2000.
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consumer prices, and still, as mentioned before, the key Czech macroeconomic
figures do not imply overvaluation. The conclusion that the National Bank of the
Czech Republic had no real chance of reducing appreciation significantly, even under
an alternative monetary regime, cannot be excluded either.
Certain similarities can be found with countries experiencing transitory appreciation
as well. The main similarity with the countries of Latin America is the quick increase
in budget deficit during the appreciation period. At the same time, the Hungarian
situation differs in several aspects from theirs: while in Latin America real exchange
rate appreciation originated from higher inflation under a fixed exchange rate regime,
in Hungary it was in equally due to the strengthening of the nominal exchange rate
and to higher inflation compared to that of foreign countries. Permanent exchange rate
appreciation had no fundamental basis in the Latin American countries, while in
Hungary it does. Contrary to the high inflation in Latin America, inflation in Hungary
was around ten percent when rapid exchange rate appreciation began, and the degree
of appreciation also remained below the figures observed in those countries. Finally,
maybe one of the most important aspects is that the Hungarian government is
committed to reduce the budget deficit, which was also laid down in the Mid-term
Economic Policy Program. Therefore, various similarities can be pointed out with the
industrial countries experiencing temporary appreciation. At the same time, it is
important to emphasize that Hungary differs from both groups in that it is on a
catching-up track that projects a strengthening of the equilibrium real exchange rate,
and probably also in that the real exchange rate was undervalued to a certain extent
before the onset of rapid appreciation.
When analyzing the current and expected consequences of appreciation, signs of
processes approaching the degree of the adverse macroeconomic outcomes following
periods of temporary appreciation are not visible. Although figures measuring the
mid-term effects of appreciation will only be available in the future, and in 2002 GDP
growth slowed down, investments lessened and the unemployment rate slightly
increased, market expectations and current growth figures show a fairly positive
picture when compared to international experience. Despite the fact that in Hungary –
similarly to Portugal and countries experiencing temporary appreciation – the foreign
business cycle developed adversely,  and the GDP growth rate did not decrease to the
same extent as observed in the above-mentioned countries, but was 3.3 percent in
2002. This was in part probably due to the expansive fiscal policy, while in Latin
America, where fiscal deficit also rose to eight percent of GDP on average, a process
of substantial decrease in GDP began as early as in the appreciation period. In
contrast, according to market analysts surveyed by Reuters, the rate of economic
growth in Hungary will accelerate in 2003-2004. They expect an average growth of
3.5 percent in 2003 and 4.0 percent in 2004. These figures are significantly more
favorable than the GDP decreases during the Latin American worst-case scenarios,
and are definitely more favorable than the small-scale GDP decreases of Portugal and
the industrial countries experiencing temporary appreciation. In addition to this,
market analysts do not expect deterioration in the account of the current balance of
payments to GDP ratio, and in their view appreciation and a decrease in inflation will
be permanent. Moreover, they expect a further minor decrease in inflation and further
slight real exchange rate appreciation.
Obviously, the real economic effects of rapid appreciation can only be analyzed
comprehensively in the future, but it seems to be certain that these effects will be
strongly influenced through the fiscal and income policies.  In the floating exchange
rate regimes where the real exchange rate appreciation proved to be transitory but led
33
to a permanent reduction in inflation and the external balance did not deteriorate
during the appreciation and the output loss was less pronounced than in many
exchange-rate based stabilizations, and mostly in cases where real exchange rate
appreciation proved to be permanent, moderate or decreasing fiscal budget deficits
and stable real wages could be observed.
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5. Appendix “A”: Macroeconomic Figures of Countries Exhibiting
Transitory Appreciation: Latin America and Turkey
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Brazil
Since 1981, when price index data first became available in the IFS of the IMF, inflation
dropped below 100 per cent first in 1995.
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6. Appendix “B”: Macroeconomic Figures of Countries Exhibiting
Transitory Appreciation: Developed Industrial Countries
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
.12
.16
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
DGDP_AUS
CAGDP_AUS
DCPI_AUS
L_RIP_AUS
GOVGDP_AUS
RI_AUS
WGDP_AUS
D
G
D
P,
 D
C
PI
, C
A/
G
D
P,
 G
O
V/
G
D
P,
 R
I, 
W
G
D
P
LO
G
(R
ER
)
Australia
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
.12
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
DGDP_CAN
CAGDP_CAN
DCPI_CAN
L_RIP_CAN
GOVGDP_CAN
RI_CAN
WGDP_CAN
D
G
D
P,
 D
C
PI
, C
A/
G
D
P,
 G
O
V/
G
D
P,
 R
I, 
W
G
D
P
LO
G
(R
ER
)
Canada
42
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
4.40
4.45
4.50
4.55
4.60
4.65
4.70
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
DGDP_NZL
CAGDP_NZL
DCPI_NZL
L_RIP_NZL
GOVGDP_NZL
RI_NZL
WGDP_NZL
D
G
D
P,
 D
C
PI
, C
A/
G
D
P,
 G
O
V/
G
D
P,
 R
I, 
W
G
D
P
LO
G
(R
ER
)
New Zealand
-.15
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
DGDP_SWE
CAGDP_SWE
DCPI_SWE
L_RIP_SWE
GOVGDP_SWE
RI_SWE
WGDP_SWED
G
D
P,
 D
C
PI
, C
A/
G
D
P,
 G
O
V/
G
D
P,
 R
I, 
W
G
D
P
LO
G
(R
ER
)
Sweden
43
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
.25
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
DGDP_UK
CAGDP_UK
DCPI_UK
L_RIP_UK
GOVGDP_UK
RI_UK
WGDP_UK
D
G
D
P,
 D
C
PI
, C
A/
G
D
P,
 G
O
V/
G
D
P,
 R
I, 
W
G
D
P
LO
G
(R
ER
)
United Kingdom
44
7. Appendix “C”: Heterogeneity of Macroeconomic Processes in
Developed Industrial Countries Exhibiting Transitory
Appreciation
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8. Appendix “D”: Macroeconomic Figures of Countries Exhibiting
Permanent Appreciation
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9. Appendix “D”: Data sources and countries studied
Data used
Real effective
exchange rate
REER
L_RIP...
L_RLA...
L_RFE...
L_RAZ...
L_RAF...
Based on consumer price indices, in comparison with the 24 main
foreign trading partners, using fixed weighting representing the foreign
trade structure of the 1990s. Some main foreign trading partners of
several countries were left out of consideration due to the lack of the
reliably long time series, such as Brazil, China, Russia, Hong Kong,
and the majority of the Former Yugoslav republics. Source: price index
and exchange rate: IMF–IFS, foreign trade (for weighting): IMF–
Direction of Trade Statistics
Foreign GDP
growth
WGDP...
The weighted average of the GDP growth of foreign trading partners.
The weights are identical to those used for weighting the real exchange
rate, however, Brazil omitted previously is included here as GDP
figures are available.
Real interest
rate
RI...
The average of the backward and forward looking interest rates
calculated by average annual nominal short-term interest rates
(treasury bill rates for the majority of the countries and money market
interest rate for some) and consumer price inflation. Source: IMF-IFS.
Inflation
CPI…
Average annual change of the consumer price index. Source: IMF-
IFS.
Economic
growth
GDP…
Average annual change of GDP. Source: IMF- IFS, World Bank-WDI.
Domestic
(GAPHP) and
foreign
(WGAPHP)
output gap
Deviation from the Hodrick-Prescott trend of the logarithm of the
cumulative GDP or WGDP level.
Current balance
of payments
CAGDP…
The current balance of payments versus GDP. Source of basic figures
(CA, current price GDP, exchange rate): IMF- IFS, World Bank-WDI.
Source of Portugal’s figures: Banco de Portugal.
Budget balance
GOVGDP…
The budget balance versus GDP. Source of basic figures (current price
balance and GDP): IMF- , World Bank-WDI.
Unemployment
Rate
U
Source: IMF- IFS, World Bank-WDI; Source of New Zealand’s figures
for 1980-84: Reserve Bank of New Zealand; Source of the UK’s
figures for 1970-80: National Statistics (UK)
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Export market
share
The weighted average of the standardized share of the total or regional
imports of key foreign trading partners (excluding Japan and
Venezuela), where the weights are derived from the export figures of
the country studied. The group averages represent the simple average
of each country’s standardized indices. Destination countries
considered: USA, Japan, Germany, UK, The Netherlands, Spain, and
France. Source of basic data: IMF - Direction of Trade Statistics.
Countries studied and abbreviations of their real exchange rates
Africa Asia EU
Developing
Developed Middle East Latin
America
Argentina RLA_ARG
Australia RIP_AUS
Austria RIP_AUT
Bahamas, The RLA_BAH
Bangladesh RAZ_BAN
Barbados RLA_BAR
Belgium RIP_BEL
Bolivia RLA_BOL
Brazil RLA_BRA
Bulgaria RFE_BUL
Burkina Faso RAF_BUF
Burundi RAF_BUR
Cameroon RAF_CAM
Canada RIP_CAN
Chile RLA_CHI
Colombia RLA_COL
Congo, Rep. RAF_CON
Costa Rica RLA_CRI
Cote D'Ivoire RAF_COT
Croatia RFE_CRO
Cyprus RFE_CYP
Czech Republic RFE_CZE
Denmark RIP_DEN
Ecuador RLA_ECU
Egypt RKK_EGY
El Salvador RLA_ELS
Estonia RFE_EST
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Finland RIP_FIN
France RIP_FRA
Gambia, The RAF_GAM
Germany RIP_GER
Ghana RAF_GHA
Greece RFE_GRE
Guatemala RLA_GUA
Haiti RLA_HAI
Honduras RLA_HON
Hungary RFE_HUN
Iceland RIP_ICE
India RAZ_IND
Indonesia RAZ_INA
Ireland RIP_IRE
Israel RKK_ISR
Italy RIP_ITA
Jamaica RLA_JAM
Japan RIP_JAP
Kenya RAF_KEN
Korea RAZ_KOR
Latvia RFE_LAT
Lithuania RFE_LIT
Malaysia RAZ_MAL
Mauritius RAF_MAU
Mexico RLA_MEX
Morocco RAF_MOR
Myanmar RAZ_MYA
Netherlands RIP_NED
Netherlands
Antilles
RLA_NEA
New Zealand RIP_NZL
Nigeria RAF_NIG
Norway RIP_NOR
Pakistan RAZ_PAK
Panama RLA_PAN
Paraguay RLA_PAR
Peru RLA_PER
58
Philippines RAZ_PHP
Poland RFE_POL
Portugal RIP_POR
Romania RFE_ROM
Russia RFE_RUS
Senegal RAF_SEN
Singapore RAZ_SIN
Slovak Republic RFE_SLR
Slovenia RFE_SLO
South Africa RAF_SAF
Spain RIP_ESP
Sri Lanka RAZ_SRI
Sweden RIP_SWE
Switzerland RIP_CHF
Thailand RAZ_THA
Turkey RFE_TUR
United Kingdom RIP_UK
United States RIP_USA
Uruguay RLA_URU
Venezuela RLA_VEN
